MUTUAL FUND VOTING AND FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION: WHETHER DISCLOSURE OF
FAMILY LOYALTY WOULD FACILITATE
EFFICIENT INVESTING
Ashley Fawver 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

My ultimate objective in writing this commentary is to offer additional support to Professor Ann Lipton’s thesis that mutual fund managers voting proxies as a family creates a conflict of interest among the individual mutual funds, which violates the mutual fund manager’s (“fund
manager”) fiduciary duty to each individual fund. 2 This commentary offers additional support by exploring the idea that the market may not be
allocating resources optimally due to investors being unaware that fund
managers’ centralized voting is contrary to the investors’ benefit. Furthermore, this commentary examines whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should mandate disclosure of a fund manager’s research on proxy voting to investors (“research”). Accordingly,
the following two key questions arise: (1) Whether there is a benefit in
fund managers disclosing to retail investors a simplified version of the
fund manager’s research on proxy voting, along with the current mandatory disclosures the SEC already requires; and (2) Whether disclosure of
the research would cure the capital allocation deficiencies related to the
conflict of interest mutual fund family voting creates.
Part II of this commentary analyzes the market efficiency argument, i.e., that fund managers will cast proxies to each mutual funds’
benefit, otherwise investors will choose to allocate their resources in a
different manner. Part III of this commentary examines factors other
than the fund managers’ research that may drive fund managers to vote a
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specific way, which would render disclosure of the proxy voting research
pointless.
II.

THERE IS A BENEFIT IN PROVIDING INVESTORS WITH PROXY
VOTING RESEARCH

As explained more fully herein, investors would most likely benefit from disclosures of the research fund managers conduct to determine
how to vote proxies. Under current disclosure requirements, retail investors are not entitled to fund managers’ proxy voting research. 3 However,
disclosure of a fund manager’s proxy voting research could serve as a
signal to investors that the fund manager is voting for the individual mutual fund’s benefit. Furthermore, due to the hardship of switching mutual funds, investors would most likely benefit from disclosure of this
research before investing in a mutual fund.
A. Market Efficiency and Information Asymmetries
Financial professionals promote the theory that an efficient market will allocate resources to different mutual funds if the conflict of interest caused by centralized voting causes the fund to underperform. 4
The theory is that investors can either choose to invest in a different
fund to begin with, or an investor can choose to exit their current underperforming fund. Thus, financial professionals argue that mutual
fund managers have good business incentives to manage conflicts of interest so to attract and retain business.
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However, for this market theory to work, investors must be informed. A key assumption in this theory is that all retail investors have
the same information about the mutual fund as the fund manager. When
this assumption fails, the failure leads to market information asymmetries. 5 When there is asymmetric information “prices are distorted and
do not achieve optimality in the allocation of resources.” 6 Thus, when
investors are uninformed, resources are not allocated optimally. 7
B. Current Proxy Voting Required Disclosures
Currently, the SEC mandates disclosure with respect to proxy
voting for mutual funds through the Investment Company Act of 1940. 8
The SEC requires mutual funds to file a report known as Form N-PX,
which contains the mutual fund’s complete proxy voting record for the
past twelve months. 9 The Form N-PX discloses to the public whether
the matter was proposed by management or a shareholder, whether the
mutual fund voted on the matter, and, if so, how the mutual fund voted. 10
Additionally, Rule 206(4)-6 requires mutual funds to adopt and
disclose broad voting policies and procedures that are “reasonably designed to ensure that the adviser votes proxies in the best interest of clients.” 11 While the broad policies and procedures do address general sit-
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uations, the SEC does not require disclosure specific to each matter voted on. 12
The SEC also requires mutual fund advisers to retain a copy of
any document that was material in the adviser’s decision-making process
to voting proxies. 13 However, these documents are not disclosed to investors. 14
C. Nondisclosure of Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Research Puts Investors at an
Informational Disadvantage
Noticeably missing from the SEC required disclosures are the research a fund manager conducts in connection to proxy votes and the
material documents that the fund manager relied upon when determining
how to vote the proxies. While investors have access to the mutual
funds policies and procedures and actual voting record, there are no
documents disclosed that connects the two or evidences the fact that the
proxy vote was in fact for the benefit of the mutual fund. 15
As a result, investors are potentially unaware that fund managers
vote proxies contrary to the mutual fund’s benefit by voting proxies as a
fund family. Without access to this information, investors invest in mutual funds without taking that breach of fiduciary duty into consideration
when determining a fair price for investing in the mutual fund. Thus,
investors are at an informational disadvantage when picking a mutual
fund to invest in, which could distort prices and result in the market not
achieving optimality in the allocation of capital. 16
D. Disclosure of Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Research Would Signal to Investors the Quality of the Mutual Fund
As things currently stand, investors are not privy to the research
driving a fund manager’s proxy voting decisions. Access to the simplified
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research would serve one main purpose. Investors would have the opportunity to determine whether the mutual fund manager was in fact voting for its benefit. This would enable the market to allocate resources
more efficiently because investors would be able to make an informed
decision before investing in a mutual fund that was potentially breaching
its fiduciary duty.
More specifically, disclosure of the proxy voting research would
act as a signal. 17 Fund managers can signal the lack of conflict of interest
and thus the quality of the mutual fund by offering research to verify the
fund manager’s proxy voting is in the best interest of each individual
fund. Even if the proxy voting research shows that the proxy vote was
not in the best interest of each individual fund, fund managers can
demonstrate that the centralized voting benefits all mutual funds individually by keeping the management fees low. 18 Accordingly, investors
could make the informed choice to opt in to the mutual fund once fund
managers demonstrate that the costs of researching and voting for each
fund individually would dramatically raise management cost.
E. Investors Would Benefit Most from Disclosure Prior to Investing in a
Mutual Fund
Because investors have a difficult time exiting and/or switching
mutual funds, fund managers should disclose research to investors prior
to an investor investing in a mutual fund. Along with the reasons Professor Lipton’s essay states, there are government and self-regulatory organization rules and regulations that make an investor’s task of switching
mutual funds difficult. 19 Therefore, if the SEC actually considers mandating this type of disclosure, investors would benefit most if fund manag-
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ers were to make past proxy voting research available prior to investors
investing in its fund.
Specifically, rules regulating intermediaries like broker-dealers incentivize a broker-dealer not to recommend an investor switch mutual
funds. Currently, a large number of intermediaries sell shares to investors. Likewise, investors depend on intermediaries to make recommendations and to actually buy shares. If broker-dealers were informed of a
fund manager’s breach of fiduciary duty, it is unclear whether a brokerdealer would recommend to an investor to exit a mutual fund in order to
enter another. This is so because broker-dealers are subject to strict suitability rules. 20 Mutual fund switching is a practice regulators generally
think to be unsuitable which subjects broker-dealers to higher scrutiny
and forces them to defend their recommendations to regulators. 21 For
this reason, there is incentive for a broker-dealer to not to recommend a
mutual fund switch.
As explained more fully herein, investors would most likely benefit by a fund manager disclosing its research on proxy voting. Because
retail investors are not currently entitled to any fund manager’s proxy
voting research, investors—at the time of investing in a mutual fund—
are unaware of whether fund managers are voting proxies for the mutual
fund’s benefit. In the interest of signaling the quality of the mutual fund,
fund managers can disclose this research to investors in an effort to ensure optimality in resource allocation.
III.

FACTORS OTHER THAN PROXY VOTING RESEARCH DRIVES
MUTUAL FUND VOTING

While there would most likely be a benefit in fund managers disclosing proxy voting research as a signaling device, the disclosure may
not ensure the optimization of resource allocation. Studies evidence the
fact that other factors drive fund managers to vote proxies a specific
way, which could make disclosure of the fund managers’ research on
20
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proxy voting irrelevant. Thus, it is likely that fund managers providing
research to investors would not fix any capital allocation discrepancies in
the market related to the lack of research available to investors on fund
managers’ proxy voting.
Specifically, a recent study shows that fund managers are more
inclined to vote in favor of management-sponsored proposals in locally
headquartered companies. 22 The results of the study suggest that “social
networks and interactions between firm executives and fund managers
impact the latter’s proxy voting decisions.” 23 That is, “[i]f mutual fund
managers enjoy good relationships with the management of the firms in
their portfolios, they are more likely to vote favorably in proposals sponsored by the management” without regard to the any research performed. 24
Another study shows that business ties between a mutual fund
and a portfolio corporation influences funding. 25 For example, there are
situations where a fund manager also manages the retirement plan assets
of a portfolio company. 26 In this case, the fund manager is incentivized
to support management recommendations to further its own business
interests (i.e., gain and/or retain business from the portfolio corporation)
rather than voting to maximize the wealth of the mutual fund investors. 27
Thus, “the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely it is to
vote in favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by manage-
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ment.” 28 Regardless of the research, “[b]usiness ties affect the overall
voting practices at the fund family level.” 29
Other studies show “the presence of peer effects in mutual fund
voting.” 30 Specifically, fund managers demonstrate herd like behavior
when it comes to proxy voting. 31 A fund manager “is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose it as
well.” 32 Likewise, “fund managers are more likely to vote ‘for’ when their
expectations about the number of ‘for’ votes cast by other funds are
higher.” 33
These studies demonstrate that factors other than the fund manager’s research on proxy voting drive the proxy voting process. Thus,
disclosure of a fund manager’s research would not necessarily cure all
capital allocation discrepancies. While the point of disclosure is to assist
an investor in comparing one mutual fund with another mutual fund to
make an informed decision, disclosing research to investors on proxy
voting may be ineffective if factors other than the research are driving
proxy voting.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate objective in writing this commentary is to offer additional support for Professor Lipton’s thesis by exploring the idea that
the market may not be allocating resources optimally due to investors
being unaware that fund managers’ centralized voting is contrary to the
investors’ benefit. Furthermore, this commentary examines whether the
SEC should mandate disclosure of a fund manager’s research on proxy
voting to investors in order to cure any capital allocation deficiencies.
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Accordingly, this commentary concludes that while disclosure of the
fund manager’s research can serve as a signal to assist investors in comparing the fund with other funds, disclosing research to investors on
proxy voting may be ineffective in ensuring optimization in the allocation of resources if factors other than the proxy voting research are driving fund managers’ proxy voting. Thus, additional disclosure may not
add any benefit to the investors’ decision and instead serve as an added
cost to investors.

